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A Two-Year Comparison of Populism in European 
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Frank Esser, Agnieszka Stępińska, Ondrej Pekacek, Antonella Seddone, 
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, Dobrinka Peicheva, Ana Milojevic, Sina 
Blassnig, Sven Engesser 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on trends in reporting over time. It examines the presence of 
populist key messages in “news coverage of immigration” and “commentaries on current 
political events” in European newspapers at two points in time, namely spring 2016 and spring 
2017. The chapter has a twofold aim. First, it will explore similarities and differences in the 
populist content of European newspapers between the two periods. Second, it identifies a set of 
extra-media and intra-media explanatory factors contributing to the understanding of the 
emerging differences in a year-to-year comparison. 
The chapter by Blassnig et al. in this volume provides more detailed information about 
the newspaper stories we content-analyzed. Two types of stories are analyzed: ‘news articles 
on immigration’, and ‘editorials commenting on current political events’ irrespective of the 
topic. While the chapter by Blassnig et al. pooled and jointly investigated the data from 2016 
and 2017, and the chapter by Maurer et al. in this volume, used only content data from 2017, 
this chapter will evaluate and compare the data from 2016 and 2017. These two periods are 
seen as two phases of a news and policy cycle that responds to real world cues. The two phases 
are understood as stages of a crisis, which offer more or less favorable opportunity structures 
for populist discourse (Moffitt, 2015). As stated in the introduction to this volume, a whole 
range of contextual factors influence the populist worldview of crises and, subsequently, the 
use of populist communication in news reports and commentaries about theses crises. 
There were three important contextual factors to consider in our media content analysis, 
namely: real world events (such as migration movements and political responses to them), the 
role of political actors (such as whether populists are involved in government), and public 
opinion (what issues are perceived as problems by the population). The chapter by Maurer and 
colleagues demonstrated that there are important country differences in the use of populist key 
messages. While Maurer et al’s cross-sectional data analysis focused on the temporally 
invariant factors of journalistic culture and news logic as explanatory factors, in the following, 
the focus will be on real world events, political actors, and public opinion, since these factors 
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changed between 2016 and 2017. Links to journalistic culture and news logic will also be 
examined where necessary. While real world events and political actors belong to the supply-
side conditions of populist communication, public opinion refers to the demand-side conditions. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Supply and Demand-Side Conditions: Events, Politics and Audience Driven News 
As previous studies on the rise of populism have shown, immigration is a key source of 
concern for the general public (Koopmans & Muis, 2009; Scheepers et al., 2002; Vliegenthart, 
2018). Our study follows the European refugee crisis, which reached a first high point in the 
fall of 2015. In many countries, right-wing populist actors in particular, used popular fears as 
an opportunity to raise their profile in electoral contests (Pisoiu & Ahmed, 2016; Wodak, 2015). 
One example is Bulgaria, where the leader of the conservative party GERB, Boyko Borissov, 
used immigration for his election campaign in spring 2017 and subsequently formed a 
government coalition with the right-wing populist party United Patriots. Another example is 
Matteo Salvini, leader of the Northern League, and from 2018, Deputy Prime Minister in a 
government coalition with the 5 Star Movement in Italy. His campaign wins in the 2018 Italian 
election were also due to his use of populist anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
In line with previous research on immigration news and mediated populism, the 
expectation is that country differences in media coverage are related to supply and demand-side 
factors (Eberl et al., 2018; Esser et al., 2017; Reinemann et al., 2017; Vliegenthart, 2018; see 
also the introduction to this volume). So-called event-driven and policy-driven models for 
explaining news content react to supply-side factors, while audience-driven models for 
explaining news content refer to the relevance of demand-side factors.  
With regard to event-driven news, it has long been demonstrated (Peter, 2003) that 
journalism is contingent upon real-world conditions. Journalists interact with political events 
and sources when writing news items or commentaries, and focus on those that help them 
construct compelling stories. The event environment is relevant insofar as journalists regularly 
attribute news values to various aspects of political reality. The chapter by Maurer and 
colleagues demonstrated that journalists prefer those political events which they regard to be 
newsworthy, and they enrich them with elements of news logic and journalistic culture. Political 
reality transformed by journalists for the sake of increasing attention offers populist actors a 
favorable entry point into the news cycle to disseminate their ideas to the public.  
Politics-driven news suggests that powerful political actors and their policies and 
strategic maneuvers determine the media agenda (Wolfsfeld, 2011, pp. 1-44). News and 
commentaries are influenced by so-called primary definers to whom journalists preferentially 
turn to in their search for orientation, original insights, and authoritative interpretations of social 
reality. Populist actors in privileged positions (e.g. as media darlings, survey winners, strongest 
party, government participants) also benefit from this fact. Mazzoleni (2008) claims that the 
often seamless integration of populist messages in editorial decisions and media content is due 
to a sort of media complicity, namely a certain dependence of the media on charismatic figures, 
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provocative rhetoric, and mobilizable issues. In this chapter, however, we also want to focus on 
audience-driven models for explaining news content.  
Audience-driven models assign the audience a significant role in the formation of the 
news agenda. This model assumes that certain events and policies attract public attention and 
interest. This, in turn, influences subsequent media coverage because it corresponds with the 
professional aspirations and economic necessities of journalism, to respond to the concerns and 
anxieties of its audience. While there are some topics that can be better explained with media-
centered perspectives of agenda-building, there are other topics for which audience-driven 
models should be considered (Uscinski, 2009). An audience-driven model would expect that it 
is the public perception of problems, rather than the underlying events directly, that have an 
influence on journalistic decisions when writing news articles and commentaries on these 
problems – including the question of how much populism goes into the story. 
We will examine our data to discover which of these three explanatory models for 
changes in populism reporting, offer the most evidence. We cannot statistically test the validity 
of these three explanations in a strict sense, but we can draw plausibility conclusions. Therefore, 
we refrain from hypothesis testing, and limit ourselves to research questions:  
How does the extent of populism in the news and commentaries of European newspapers 
in 2016 and 2017 relate to supply-side conditions (expressed in immigration trends and the role 
of populist parties) (RQ 1)? 
How does the degree of populism in immigration news and political commentaries 
relate to demand-side conditions, more precisely to citizens’ perceptions of the issue of 
immigration and citizens’ assessment of the overall course of the country in 2016 and 2017 
(expressed in survey responses) (RQ 2)?  
In addition, another theoretical possibility should be considered. Recall that the chapter 
by Maurer and colleagues found, in their cross-sectional analysis, that it is not so much extra-
media contextual conditions, but rather intra-media conditions of journalistic working modes 
(professional culture, news logic), that best explain populism in news and commentaries. Our 
longitudinal analysis may also find evidence for this, therefore we must ask: 
How does the degree of populism in immigration news and political commentaries in 
2016 and 2017 relate to intra-media aspects of journalistic work (expressed in reporting 
practices) (RQ 3)? 
While politics-driven news mainly focuses on the importance of populist parties in 
national government policy (we will discuss this later), events-driven news focuses on 
immigration figures and audience-driven news on public opinion moods. We start with 
background information on the latter two aspects. 
Events and Their Perception 
To understand the perception of events, we must first turn to events themselves. To 
provide an idea of the migration dynamics in Europe during our study period, Table 7.1 presents 
the official numbers of refugees recorded by the EU for the ten countries that will be examined 
in more detail below. 
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Table 7.1 Eurostat data on asylum and first time asylum applicants (raw numbers) 
Country 2015 2016 2017 
Bulgaria  20,365 19,420 3,695 
Czech Republic  1,515 1,475 1,445 
Germany  476,510 745,155 222,560 
Greece  13,205 51,110 58,650 
Israel  - - - 
Italy  83,540 122,960 128,850 
Norway  31,110 3,485 3,520 
Poland  12,190 12,305 5,045 
Serbia  - - - 
Switzerland  39,445 27,140 18,015 
Note. No EU data available for Israel and Serbia.  
Source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en 
 
According to Eurostat data (of which Table 7.1 presents an extract), more than one 
million people migrated to the European Union via the Mediterranean, in 2015. A total of 
848,000 took the Balkan route and first arrived in Greece; 153,000 took the central 
Mediterranean route and landed in Italy. In 2015, 1,294,000 people applied for asylum in 
Europe, and 1,260,000 in 2016. By far the most applications for asylum were filed in Germany. 
Observers attested that the EU had temporarily lost control in the context of rising figures and 
the lack of regulation. There was no orderly registration and distribution of refugees. Critics 
attributed a significant share of the increase in the number of asylum seekers, to German 
Chancellor Merkel whose public statements in 2015 could be regarded as suspending the Dublin 
Regulation (setting rules for registering and distributing asylum seekers in the EU) and 
“inviting” refugees to Europe. An initially widespread refugee welcome mood gave way to a 
more critical mood among the population.  
In the wake of the refugee crisis, the issue of immigration made a huge leap on the list 
of concerns held by EU citizens. While in autumn 2014 only 25 percent of EU citizens saw 
immigration as an important problem for the EU, in autumn 2015 at the peak of the refugee 
crisis, it was 58 percent. The Eurobarometer asks citizens regularly, “What do you think are the 
two most important issues facing the European Union at the moment” and “…facing your 
country at the moment”. In spring 2016 – at the time of the first wave of our media content 
analysis – the proportion of citizens who regarded immigration as a central problem for the EU 
was Bulgaria 57 percent, Czech Republic 67 percent, Greece 40 percent, Germany 57 percent, 
Italy 44 percent, and Poland 51 percent (no data available for Israel, Norway, Serbia and 
Switzerland in Eurobarometer no. 85). EU citizens also answered the same question in relation 
to their own country, and the approval rates for immigration as a major national problem are 





Table 7.2 Eurobarometer question whether citizens perceive immigration as one of the two 













Bulgaria 8 21 13 29 15 
Czech Republic 18 47 32 25 23 
Germany 46 76 56 45 37 
Greece 11 20 20 15 12 
Israel - - - - - 
Italy 31 30 28 42 36 
Norway - - - - - 
Poland 9 17 16 11 16 
Serbia 3 14 6 7 8 
Switzerland 36a - 26a - 11a 
Note. No Eurobarometer data available for Israel, Norway, or Switzerland.   a For Switzerland, data from the 
Credit Suisse Barometer of Concerns was added. 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer no. 84 (2015), 85 (2016), 86 (2016), 87 (2017). 
 
Table 7.3 Eurobarometer question whether citizens believe that things are going in the right or 













Bulgaria 49 49 53 66 58 
Czech Republic 30 39 40 49 47 
Germany 30 48 46 40 39 
Greece 49 77 86 92 89 
Israel - - - - - 
Italy 52 51 53 70 65 
Norway - - - - - 
Poland 37 27 50 55 46 
Serbia 34 36 41 45 46 
Switzerland - - - - - 
Note: No Eurobarometer data available for Israel, Norway, or Switzerland.  
Source: Standard Eurobarometer no. 84 (2015), 85 (2016), 86 (2016), 87 (2017). 
From the point of view of populism research, the question naturally arises as to whether 
citizens in those countries in which immigration is perceived as a pressing national problem, 
will doubt the ability of the political elite to solve those problems (indicating anti-elitism). The 
Eurobarometer regularly asks whether EU citizens have the impression “that, in general, things 
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are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction” in their home country. A high level 
of approval for “in the wrong direction” expresses public dissatisfaction with the political 
situation and – importantly – those responsible for it. Table 7.3 shows the findings for those 
countries included in the content analysis. Public dissatisfaction with national institutions and 
political leaders has a connection with societal pessimism and anti-elitist populism 
(Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018). In other words, in a country where the public is dissatisfied 
with the course of national institutions and political decision-makers to date, the chances of 
populist communication in politics and the media are likely to increase. 
We will return to the findings from Table 7.1 when we search for an explanatory basis 
for event-driven news, and we will return to Tables 7.2 and 7.3 when we search for an 
explanatory basis for audience-driven news. All three tables should help us to answer Research 
Questions 1 and 2 by linking them to our media content analysis data. 
 
Method 
With regard to the central parameters of the design of our media content analysis, please 
refer to the previous chapter by Blassnig and colleagues. In that chapter you will find more 
information on the composition of the sample of newspapers and stories, our operationalization 
of populism and populist key messages, and the reliability of our content-analytical 
measurements across coders and countries. In the present chapter, we focus on a comparison 
over time, but in contrast to the previous two content analysis chapters, we must exclude France 
and the United Kingdom because their newspapers were not examined in 2016, only in 2017.  
To calculate the extent of populist communication in European press coverage over 
time, we use the same overall populism sum index as described in Blassnig et al.’s chapter in 
this volume. It can assume values from 0 to 4. A value of 0 means that no populist key message 
was contained in any of the analyzed stories. A value of 4 would mean that each story analyzed 
contained key messages from all four dimensions of populism (anti-elitism, people-centrism, 
restoring national sovereignty, and exclusion of others). Accordingly, a value of 0.5 means that 
every second story contained key messages of at least one dimension.  
 
Results 
Event and Politics-Driven Populism in the Media, 2016-2017 
Table 7.4 provides an overview of how often newspapers in the ten European countries 
analyzed have supplemented their news reports on immigration with populist key messages in 
2016 and 2017. However, the findings of Table 7.4 are not interpreted in isolation, but in 
combination with the findings from Tables 7.5 and 7.6 which help us to maintain an overall 
picture and avoid the danger of obscuring the true picture.  
Table 7.5 shows how often European newspapers have also used populist key messages 
in their commentaries on political events. In order to be able to interpret Table 7.4 meaningfully, 
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it is of further interest to discover what the most frequently discussed topics were in the 
newspaper commentaries. This is shown in Table 7.6, which lists the three most commented on 
topics in 2016 and 2017 (we have recorded an additional 20 topics, but they were much rarer); 
in addition, the table shows how strongly the newspaper commentaries presented these three 
topics in a populist way. Table 7.6 reveals that immigration was the most commented on topic 
in 2016; in the following year, 2017, most comments were about Europe and the question of 
whether it can meet its challenges.  
 
Table 7.4 Frequency of populist key messages in news stories about immigration in 2016 and 
2017, expressed as mean values of the populism index   
 
Country 
2016 2017 Difference in means 
between both periods M SD M SD 
Bulgaria  0.53 0.57 0.77 0.60 +0.24 
Czech Republic  0.44 0.58 0.32 0.55 -0.12 
Germany  0.79 0.78 0.76 0.83 -0.03 
Greece  0.75 0.64 0.57 0.69 -0.18 
Israel  1.0 0.98 0.71 0.86 -0.29 
Italy  0.23 0.46 0.30 0.58 +0.07 
Norway  0.20 0.43 0.19 0.39 -0.01 
Poland  0.60 0.55 1.0 0.63 +0.40 
Serbia  0.32 0.54 0.11 0.32 -0.21 
Switzerland  0.47 0.57 0.47 0.59 0.0 
TOTAL  0.53 0.61 0.52 0.60 -0.01 
Note. M= mean; SD = standard deviation. Number of key messages analyzed: N(2016) = 761, N(2017) = 762. 
Periods of media content analyses were spring 2016 (Feb. to April) and spring 2017 (Feb. to April). 
 
Table 7.5 Frequency of populist key messages in commentaries in 2016 and 2017, expressed 
as mean values of the populism index  
Country 2016 2017 Difference in means 
between both periods M SD M SD 
Bulgaria  0.64 0.71 0.68 0.87 +0.04  
Czech Republic  0.52 0.62 0.23 0.48 -0.29 
Germany  0.80 0.68 0.86 0.67 +0.08 
Greece  0.95 0.53 0.98 0.61 +0.03 
Israel  1.17 0.75 1.15 0.81 -0.02 
Italy  0.36 0.51 0.40 0.54 +0.04 
Norway  0.22 0.48 0.19 0.39 -0.03 
Poland  0.96 0.47 1.17 0.52 +0.21 
Serbia  0.76 0.69 0.59 0.62 -0.20 
Switzerland  0.83 0.76 0.59 0.67 - 0.21 
TOTAL  0.72 0.62 0.68 0.62 -0.04 
Notes: M= mean; SD = standard deviation. Number of key messages in commentaries analyzed: N(2016) = 588, 





Table 7.6 The three most frequently addressed topics in the commentaries of European 
newspapers, and the combination of these topics with populist key messages  
            Frequency N (%) Overall populism index (mean) 
Topic 2016 2017 Year-to-year 
difference  
2016 2017 Difference in 
means 
Immigration 149 (15%) 86 (9%) -6% 0.80 0.63 -0.23 
Societal values & 
norms 
124 (13%) 124 (13%) 0% 0.83 0.75 -0.08 
Europe 111 (12%) 131 (13%) +1% 0.80 0.78 -0.02 
Note: Up to three topics per commentary could be coded; frequencies were summed up. Missing data to 100 percent, 
concern commentaries on other topics which we have not listed here for reasons of clarity 
 
With regard to the first research question, there are links between the frequency with 
which the topic of immigration is discussed in news items, and commentaries using populist 
key messages – and the presence of refugees and populist actors in the respective countries. For 
example, the high populist values of German and Greek newspapers in their news (Table 7.4) 
and commentaries on immigration and Europe (Table 7.6) can be interpreted as a reaction to 
the many arriving refugees and the associated political challenges in the context of an 
unenforced Dublin regulation. On the other hand, in countries where the number of refugees 
had been restricted rapidly (e.g. Norway; see Table 7.1), the proportion of populism in 
immigration news and commentaries was low (see Tables 7.4 and 7.5). In Serbia where few 
immigrants stopped during the refugee crisis, immigration never became a big topic for the 
media. 
The finding that reporting on immigration is higher in the regions more affected by it, 
has been well corroborated in research literature. For example, Dunaway, Branton, and 
Abrajano (2010) found for the United States, that media attention to immigration is greater in 
border-states than in non-border states. In view of the high populist values for German and 
Greek newspapers in 2016, however, it is rather the populism-using reporting of the 
immigration issue that can be explained in this way. A similarly high trend of populism-infused 
coverage could also have been expected for Italy. However, although public concern about 
rising immigration flows and media coverage of the immigration issue, was high in 2016/2017, 
Italian newspapers were reluctant to use populist key messages (Table 7.4 and 7.5). At the same 
time, however, these newspapers focused strongly on tightening immigration controls on boat 
traffic with Libya, and tightening the naturalization law for babies born to foreigners in Italy, 
as was revealed upon closer scrutiny of Italian news stories and commentaries.  
In the newspapers of the three countries most affected by arriving refugees (Germany, 
Greece, Italy) it is striking that the populist coloration of their reporting was not determined by 
xenophobic, exclusionary messages, but by anti-elitist statements (on the prominence of anti-
elitist media coverage, see also Blassnig et al.’s chapter of this volume). This is particularly 
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noticeable in the case of Greece. In 2016, the Greek newspapers voiced their criticism of an 
ineffective “EU relocation and resettlement scheme”, which would not bring relief due to the 
refusal of many EU states to accept Greek and Italian immigrants. They also criticized the “EU 
Turkey refugee deal”, which would not bring relief due to various problems between Greece 
and Turkey at the time. The anti-elitist criticism by Greek newspapers was also directed against 
Brussels because its “Dublin III regulation” would contribute to even more catastrophic 
conditions in Greece’s already overburdened first-time reception centers, by returning refugees 
back to them from countries such as Germany. Between 2016 and 2017, the use of exclusionary 
populist statements in immigration news and commentaries decreased in all countries studied – 
including those countries most affected by new arrivals – whereas anti-elitist statements 
predominated.1 
Other countries revealed a different pattern. This brings us to European countries where 
immigration figures were low and were reduced even further from 2016 to 2017, but the degree 
of mediated populism was high, and it increased even further from 2016 to 2017. This applies, 
for example, to Bulgaria and Poland (see Tables 7.1, 7.4, and 7.5). Here the reporting obviously 
does not react to the actual immigration, but rather to what populist actors have done with the 
topic (politics-driven news instead of event-driven news). As previously mentioned, Bulgarian 
populists took advantage of the issue in their 2017 general election campaign. In countries with 
strong populist actors, some of whom had governmental responsibility (this includes Poland, 
Israel, Switzerland), news and commentary reacted more strongly to the handling of events by 
politicians, than to the genuine events themselves.  
In summary, to answer RQ1 there was some tentative evidence of a connection between 
(i) the extent of populism in the news and commentaries of European newspapers in 2016 and 
2017 and (ii) supply side conditions, in this case immigration events and political actions. 
Audience-Driven Populism in the Media, 2016-2017 
The topic of immigration is such that an audience-driven effect on news content can be 
expected. Certain problems stimulate public interest and awareness to such an extent that for 
professional and economic reasons, journalists feel compelled to respond in news and 
commentary (Uscinski, 2009). The second research question asks how citizens’ perception of 
immigration as an important issue and their assessment of the overall course of the country, 
relates to the subsequent populism-infused reporting of immigration. 
The data in Figure 7.1 give us initial indications that there may be parallels between 
longer-term trends in the public perception of the immigration problem, and longer-term trends 
in news reporting on immigration. It would be wrong to overstretch the data, but what Figure 






Figure 7.1 Co-development of populism in migration news and perceived salience of 
immigration among citizens / the audience (difference between 2016 and 2017 in %) 
 
In countries where there has been an increase in the public perception of immigration as 
an urgent problem, there has been an increase in populism-using reporting on the issue over the 
same period. According to Eurobarometer data in Table 7.2, the increase in the perceived 
importance of the topic between spring 2016 and spring 2017 was +2 for Bulgaria and +8 for 
Italy, and the increase in reporting over the same period was +24 for Bulgaria and +8 for Italy 
(according to Table 7.4). Correspondingly, we find that in countries where concerns about 
immigration among the population decreased between spring 2016 and spring 2017 (Czech 
Republic -9, Germany -19, Greece -8), populist coverage of immigration also decreased (Czech 
Republic -12, Germany -3, Greece -18).  
Audience Perceptions, Events and Media Examined Together, 2016-2017 
The findings presented in Figure 7.1 can only be considered a weak indication of the 
audience-driven model for explaining news content. An alternative is to compare relevant data 
from 2016 and 2017 and check their correlative relationships more comprehensively by 
integrating other relevant variables into a systematic overall model. We constructed such a 
model with the data provided in the previous tables, and we offer a graphical presentation of it 
in Figure 7.2. The model includes data from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Norway, Poland, Serbia, and Switzerland. Where data from Eurostat or Eurobarometer was not 
available, the cases were excluded on a case-by-case basis. The correlations between the cases 
were calculated using Pearson coefficients. Where for logical reasons there can only be one-
sided influence relationships, we worked with one-sided significance tests (represented by → 
arrows); where there can be two-sided influence relationships, we used two-sided significance 




Figure 7.2 Path model comparing relationships between real world events, audience perceptions, and media coverage in 2016 and 2017 
Notes: N = 9 countries. Only Pearson coefficients r ≥ .35 are shown; #p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01
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Figure 7.2 has three levels: events, perceptions, and media. On the level of perceptions 
– at the center of the chart – two variables of the audience-driven model are located: “share of 
citizens perceiving immigration as a major national issue”2, and “share of citizens expressing 
dissatisfaction with the direction of the country and political decision makers”3. According to 
the assumptions of the audience-driven model, the perceived salience of the immigration issue 
and the widespread anxiety and political dissatisfaction (of the public) is seen as a cause for 
populism-infused immigration reporting, or populism-infused commentary on the current 
political situation (by journalists). While the first variable suggests that journalists react to the 
topic of immigration (and its implications) with people-centrist and perhaps even exclusionary 
key messages, the second variable suggests that anti-elitist and perhaps even national-
sovereigntist messages will also be included in the coverage.  
At the highest level, Figure 7.2 also takes into account real world events which are likely 
to influence the perceptions of the population on one hand, and media coverage on the other. 
As reality cues, we have included the “number of arriving asylum applications in country”4 as 
a potential influencing factor. Finally, at the lowest level of Figure 7.2, we find media coverage 
broken down by the two indicators “populist key messages in commentaries on current political 
issues”5, and “populist key messages in news coverage on immigration”6.  
How do we interpret the findings of Figure 7.2? Our interest in the audience-driven 
model first draws our attention to paths (2), (3), and (4). They tell us that journalists using 
populist key messages in 2016 were equally responsive to the population’s concerns about the 
immigration issue (2) and to citizens’ dissatisfaction with directional decisions taken by 
political elites (3, 4). These audience driven influences are only marginally weaker than real-
world influences, i.e. the actual number of arriving refugees (path 1), on the use of populist 
messages in the immigration news. However: all mentioned influences of the paths (1) to (4) 
are only between r=.41 and r=.51; they are comparatively low and insignificant in a statistical 
sense. The soft evidence for audience-driven news presented in Figure 7.1 cannot be 
corroborated substantially in the more complex model of Figure 7.2. In other words, neither for 
2016, nor 2017, do the correlations in Figure 7.2 give us statistically significant indications that 
journalists’ use of populist messages in news or commentaries is related to audience-driven 
processes.  
Events, on the other hand, have a greater influence than the audience. The number of 
arriving asylum applicants in a country in 2016 and 2017 largely determined the share of 
citizens perceiving immigration to be a major national issue in 2016 (path 5) and 2017 (paths 6 
and 7). However: the influence of immigration figures on the extent of populism in the 
immigration news coverage, remained very weak both in 2016 and 2017 (paths 1 and 8). While 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 had found soft evidence for the validity of the event-driven news model in 
some selected countries (e.g. Germany and Greece), this influence disappears when all 
countries are considered together (as in Figure 7.2). 
According to Figure 7.2, the best explanation for events, audience perceptions, and 
media coverage in the year 2017, was the previous conditions of 2016. The highly significant 
autocorrelations of paths (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13) indicate that conditions in the various 
countries did not develop arbitrarily, but followed path-dependent patterns. Political decisions 
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on how many asylum seekers are allowed into the country, have evolved as consistently as 
public opinion and the practices of national news organizations. 
A Deeper Look at the Role of the Media 
This seemingly great consistency in news organization practices deserves a closer look 
– and it brings us to our third research question. The fact that we find hardly any noteworthy 
evidence in Figure 7.2 for the assumptions of the event-driven and audience-driven model to 
explain populism in media coverage, draws our attention to the explanatory factor introduced 
by RQ 3, namely intra-media aspects of journalistic work.  
Indeed, the extent of populist key messages in political commentaries and immigration 
news in 2017 is not primarily determined by public opinion or the events of the same year, but 
by processes of journalistic self-referentiality (see the multiple mutual influences at the level of 
the “media” in Figure 7.2). Various scholars such as Stanyer (2014) have pointed to the fact 
that newspapers monitor each other’s coverage closely and respond accordingly; they align 
their reporting and commenting with the practices of journalists from other media, or with 
previous publications of their own staff. Inter-media agenda setting and journalists’ herd 
behavior can influence news decisions and editorial positions; processes of professional 
socialization and social control within news organizations can further promote convergence of 
attitudes and practices. In terms of our topic, mediated populism may be less determined by 
extra-media factors, and more by intra-media factors.  
To explain the paths (14), (15), and (17), Schoenbach’s (2008) concept of synchronizing 
news and opinion is helpful. In his understanding, “synchronization” means the selection and 
presentation of news to favor a medium’s marked editorial policy or stance. Synchronized news, 
then, is news selected and presented to support a medium’s anti or pro‐immigration sentiments, 
for instance, or its liberal or conservative philosophy (Schoenbach, 2008). This argument is 
congruent with Kepplinger et al.’s (1991) “theory of instrumental actualization”. It describes 
the tendency of journalists to align their news decisions with their previous editorial positions 
– in an attitude-fitting fashion. Path (16) further indicates that journalists rely heavily on 
examples and events they have covered in the news (and their framing) to comment on what is 
going on in the world. This is line with Scheufele’s (2006) work on journalistic framing which 
argues that journalists set frames with their earlier reporting that influence their later editorial 
decisions.  
Recall that Research Questions 1 and 2 asked if growing populism in immigration news 
could be a response to immigration-related real-world trends or to growing public concerns 
about immigration and directional decisions taken by political elites. The answer is that there 
is hardly any convincing empirical evidence for it. This does not mean that the events and 
concerns of the population do not play a role, but rather that they are not the main explanatory 
factors for how much populism there is in media reports. However, the comparison of two time 
periods further supports conclusions we already made in Maurer et al.’s chapter, on the basis 
of cross-sectional data analysis – namely that intra-media factors such as journalistic culture 
and news logic, play a powerful role in explaining populism in the news. We can thus answer 




Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter is based on the same content analysis data presented in detail in Blassnig 
et al.’s chapter of this volume. Unlike the previous two chapters, the focus here is on a 
comparison of 2016 and 2017 in order to understand trends in the use of populist key messages 
in news articles and commentaries. Theoretically speaking, the two periods under study can be 
seen as two phases of a crisis in which different conditions prevailed with regard to migration 
movements, political reactions, and problem perceptions of the public.  
The findings show that the presence of populism in news and commentaries in some 
countries, is loosely related to actual migration dynamics (in the sense of event-driven news; 
see Germany and Greece), whereas in other countries it seems to follow more intensive political 
debates, although actual immigration is less dramatic (in the sense of politics-driven news; see 
Bulgaria, Poland). There are fewer indications than expected that the populist tendencies in 
news and commentaries are a reaction to the intensity with which the population views 
immigration as an important national issue or is dissatisfied with trend-setting decisions by 
political elites (in the sense of audience-driven news; the weak evidence in Figures 7.1 and 7.2). 
Finally, there are strong indications that the great importance of intra-media factors in 
explaining populism in news and commentary – already highlighted in Maurer et al.’s chapter 
– are also clearly present in our temporal comparison. This is the essential finding of Figure 
7.2. 
For an overall assessment of the situation, it is also necessary to emphasize that on 
average, there was a decline in populist news and comments in all the countries we examined, 
between 2016 and 2017. We attribute this primarily to three developments: first, the EU-Turkey 
deal in March 2016 and the resulting decline in immigration figures; second, political searches 
for solutions at EU and national level (e.g. with regard to dealing with the Dublin Regulation), 
and; third, a more reflective approach by journalists, to aspects of migration, migration policy, 
and populism. The last point is supported, for example, by the finding that the proportion of 
exclusionist populism in the immigration news of all the countries studied, decreased between 
2016 and 2017.7 However, the decline in populism was also attributable to a fourth factor, 
namely the fact that newspapers, which in 2016 had focused considerably on the international 
and Europe-wide dimensions of the crisis, returned to focusing once again more on national 
conditions in 2017. 
This study also has some limitations, many of which were already discussed in the 
chapter by Blassnig and colleagues. However, there are some additional restraints specifically 
with regard to the comparison over time. First, we are comparing only two time periods that are 
one year apart. While these two waves capture important phases during the European refugee 
crisis, a longer investigation period would have allowed more long-term analyses and broader 
conclusions. Secondly, because internationally standardized data was not available for all 
countries, our investigation of the co-development between the perceived salience of 
immigration in the public, and populism in migration news, had to remain largely descriptive. 
Thirdly, and in connection with the second point, the path model presented in Figure 7.2 is 
based on a small sample and its results should therefore be generalized only with caution. 
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In conclusion, the findings in this chapter support the theoretical position that contextual 
and situational factors influence in some countries to some extent, the use of populist 
communication in media coverage. However, it is mainly intra-media factors that explain the 
general development of reporting between 2016 and 2017. 
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Notes 
1 These analyses, differentiated according to dimensions, are not shown in the tables.  
2 For this, the Eurobarometer data for spring 2016 and spring 2017 from Table 7.2 have been included in the 
calculations. 
3 For this, the Eurobarometer data for spring 2016 and spring 2017 from Table 7.3 have been included. These 
periods correspond to the periods of our media content analysis. 
4 For this, the Eurostat data for 2016 and 2017 from Table 7.1 have been included in the calculations. 
5 For this, we used the data for 2016 and 2017 from Table 7.4. 
6 For this, we used the data for 2016 and 2017 from Table 7.5. 
7 See footnote 1. This is an additional finding that is not shown in the tables above. 
                                                          
